Philosophy of Language and the Law in H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Philosophy

Abstract

H.L.A. Hart, in his famous work, The Concept of Law, which is considered one of the most influential texts of analytical jurisprudence, emphasizes that many central problems in legal philosophy depend on an adequate understanding of language. He argues that the philosophy of language is foundational to the philosophy of law. Influenced by J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hart asserts that understanding the ordinary use of words in specific contexts is crucial for interpreting laws. It is undeniably true that lawmakers, judges, legal philosophers, and jurists frequently turn to disciplines focused on the meaning and interpretation of words. This paper examines Hart’s perspective on the role of the philosophy of language in jurisprudence and explores how he addresses issues of legal interpretation through this framework. It argues that the philosophy of language is essential to determining the scope of reasonable interpretation. A well-developed philosophical understanding of meaning and usage greatly benefits legal philosophy. Accordingly, this paper highlights its critical role in understanding the nature of law.