EDUKASYON SA PAGPAPAKATAO (Esp) AND CONFUCIAN MORAL EDUCATION

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The Department of Education’s Edukasyon sa Pagpapakatao (Esp) differentiates itself from Edukasyon sa Pagpapahalaga in that the former grounds itself predominantly on philosophical and interdisciplinary theories. Although not explicit in the DepEd’s curriculum map for Esp, the paper aims to show how the project seems to coincide with Confucian moral education. As such, the paper juxtaposes the Esp Curriculum with Confucian Moral Education in three parts. The first part considers the outcome of the Esp program and argues that it coincides with the goal of Confucian education—the formation of junzi. The second part looks into three important doctrines in Confucian moral education, namely—doctrine of the mean, benevolence and the other virtues, and filial piety—and suggests them as an addendum to Esp’s decision-making, social and emotional learning, and career guidance. The third part considers the importance of rites and arts in Confucian moral education and suggests it for the Esp curriculum.

Keywords: Pagpapakatao, Confucius, junzi, benevolence, moral education

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INTRODUCTION

The Edukasyon sa Pagpapakatao (EsP) curriculum of the Department of Education's newly installed K to 12 program identifies personalism and virtue ethics as its conceptual foundation. Directed toward the development of well-rounded persons imbued with virtues, the curriculum guide articulates other conceptual bases such as Social Learning Theory, Experiential Learning, Constructivism, and the Theory of Career Development. The curriculum distinguishes itself from Edukasyon sa Pagpapahalaga because it grounds itself in ethics and career guidance more than in psychology and values education. Interestingly, despite its many identified Western conceptual sources, the EsP curriculum seems to have ignored the Confucian model of moral education.

The Confucian model of moral education attributes the development of a country to a person's and the people's moral character; it focuses on self-cultivation in order to develop harmonious filial and social relationships for the benefit of the country and the common good. This is similar to the identified outcomes of the EsP: 1) Pananagutang Pansarili at Mabuting Kasapi ng Pamilya, 2) Pakikipagkapwa-tao, 3) Paggawa Tungo sa Pambansang Pag-unlad at Pakikibahagi sa Pandaigdigang Pagkakaisa, and 4) Pananalig at Pagmamahal sa Diyos at Paninindigan sa Kabutihan. The first outcome is self-cultivation. The second and third outcomes are reducible to the development of harmonious filial and social relationships for countrywide development, and the fourth outcome refers to faith in God and the common good.

Seeing the apparent similarity between the Confucian moral education and the EsP curriculum, I argue that Confucian ideals can also provide a conceptual framework for EsP. Following the reduction above of the EsP outcomes into three themes: self, others (family and society), and God (and the Common Good), the paper articulates the Confucian “rule by morality” in three parts. The first part looks into moral education as the self-cultivation of the junzi, who instills moral virtues to the general public. The second part discusses benevolence and other virtues as they moderate social relations using the doctrine of the mean. The third part analyzes how filial piety, rites, and music serves as codes of conduct and criteria in evaluating the development of peoples.

SELF-CULTIVATION AND THE JUNZI

The functional literacy of the EsP curriculum involves the formation of ethical persons, who possesses the following macro skills of understanding (pag-unawa), reflecting (pagninilay), consulting (pagsangguni), deciding (pagpapasya), and acting (pagkilos). Beginning with the end in mind, the Confucian tradition names the person, who possesses the following macro skills, as a junzi. In the Analects, Confucius speaks highly of the junzi (superior man) in this way:

Confucius said, “The superior man has nine things which are subjects with him of thoughtful consideration. In regard to the use of his eyes, he is anxious to see clearly. In regard to the use of his ears, he is anxious to hear distinctly. In regard to his countenance, he is anxious that it should be benign.
In regard to his speech, he is anxious that it should be sincere. In regard to his doing of business, he is anxious that it should be reverently careful. In regard to what he doubts about, he is anxious to question others. When he is angry, he thinks of the difficulties (his anger may involve him in). When he sees gain to be got, he thinks of righteousness. He acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his actions.

The object of the superior man is truth. Food is not his object.... The superior man is anxious lest he should not get truth; he is not anxious lest poverty should come upon him.

The Master said, “The superior man is distressed by his want of ability. He is not distressed by men not knowing of him.”

The way of the superior man is threefold, but I am not equal to it. Virtuous, he is free from anxieties; wise, he is free from perplexities; bold, he is free from fear.

The Master said, “The superior man is dignified, but does not wrangle. He is sociable, but not partisan.”

The Master said, “Without recognizing the ordinances of Heaven, it is impossible to be a superior man.”

As a person of virtue, the junzi is to be imitated, whereas the xiaoren (mean man) is to be abandoned. In order to show the distinction between the two, the Analects compares them in many instances:

Confucius said, “There are three things of which the superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the ordinances of Heaven. He stands in awe of great men. He stands in awe of the words of sages. The mean man does not know the ordinances of Heaven, and consequently does not stand in awe of them. He is disrespectful to great men. He makes sport of the words of sages.”

The Master said, “The progress of the superior man is upwards; the progress of the mean man is downwards.”

The distinction clarifies the junzi from the xiaoren. As it seems, the superior man is an outcome of proper education. The junzi possesses the following characteristics—“in his conduct of himself, he was humble; in serving his superior, he was respectful; in nourishing the people, he was kind; in ordering the people, he was just.”

When one looks at the description of the junzi, it is easy to decipher how they act on the basis of an understanding based on reflection and consideration.

Sze-mâ Nîû asked about the superior man. The Master said, “The superior man has neither anxiety nor fear.” “‘Being without anxiety or fear!’ said Nîû; ‘does this constitute what we call the superior man?’” The Master said, “When internal examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be anxious about, what is there to fear?”

As such, only persons, who understand their actions and who have deliberately reflected on and weighed their choices, can stand by their decisions without fear or anxiety. This explains why they appear to be firm and decided.

The superior man is correctly firm, and not merely firm.

Tsze-hsiâ said, “The superior man undergoes three changes. Looked at from a distance, he appears stern; when approached, he is mild; when he is heard to speak, his language is firm and decided.”

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9 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” II, XIII in Ibid., 140.
10 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XV, XXXI in Ibid., 354.
11 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XV, XVIII in Ibid., 349.
16 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XIV, XXIV in Ibid., 328.
18 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XII, IV in Ibid., 281.
Not only do they know where they stand on different matters, but they also act and live on the basis of these choices.

He has his hatreds. He hates those who proclaim the evil of others. He hates the man who, being in a low station, slanders his superiors. He hates those who have valor merely, and are unobservant of propriety. He hates those who are forward and determined, and, at the same time, of contracted understanding.\textsuperscript{21}

The superior man in everythin [sic] considers righteousness to be essential. He performs it according to the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in humility. He completes it with sincerity.\textsuperscript{22}

The \textit{junzi}, therefore, is the perfect model for persons, who possess the EsP macro skills. Having deduced the \textit{junzi} as the model for EsP, it now becomes a question of how they are produced.

Confucius points to education as responsible for the formation of the \textit{junzi}. This education begins in one’s self: “What the superior man seeks, is in himself. What the mean man seeks, is in others.”\textsuperscript{23} More than a desire from without, the \textit{junzi} searches and seeks from within. As such, being a good person is a consequence of self-cultivation—a response to the internal demand to be human. Self-cultivation is the key to producing the \textit{junzi}. Aside from mere understanding (\textit{pag-unawa}), it includes reflecting (\textit{pagninilay}), consulting (\textit{pagsangguni}), deciding (\textit{pagpapasya}), and acting (\textit{pagkilos}). Self-cultivation assures life-long learning that is important in the development of character. Confucius explains:

Those who are born with the possession of knowledge are the highest class of men. Those who learn, and so, readily, get possession of knowledge, are the next. Those who are dull and stupid and yet do not learn—they are the lowest of the people.\textsuperscript{24}

As it is difficult to be a sage—the highest class of men, we aspire to be like “those who learn, and so, readily, get possession of knowledge”; learning and thinking are correlatives in moral advancement. Thinking involves understanding and reflecting on prior knowledge to generate new insights, consult alternatives, and weigh values based on personal experience, attitudes, and the like with the goal of living out virtue; in this sense, thinking involves constant reference to the self or self-reflexivity. Reflexivity compares one’s behavior with moral standards in order to make one’s behavior more congruent with moral standards. To make this alignment, it is not enough to simply learn what is good; it is a practice that forms one’s character.

The Master said, “By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart.”\textsuperscript{25}

A \textit{junzi} is defined by their character, but to what extent can human nature affect self-cultivation? Confucius thinks that “[b]y nature, men are nearly alike”\textsuperscript{26}; but this is not so for his followers. Mencius looks at human nature as innately good...

because becoming a good person is the result of developing our innate tendencies toward benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety. These tendencies are manifested in distinctly moral emotions, correlated with the virtues. Each human “inherently” has a heart with the capacity for these emotions. They will manifest themselves, at least sporadically, in each human. If we “reflect upon” these manifestations, we can develop our innate capacities into fully formed virtues.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{itemize}
\item [21] Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XVII, XXIV, in Ibid., 392-393.
\item [22] Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XV, XVII in Ibid., 349.
\item [23] Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XV, XX in Ibid., 350.
\item [26] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
This heart carries four virtues: “The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence; that of shame and dislike, the principle of righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of propriety; and that of approving and disapproving, the principle of knowledge.” These four virtues are formed from the inside even if it is directed outside; it is this good heart that encourages virtue and sustains the person to act.

Because of this innate nature, any person (regardless of class, ethnicity, or religion) can become a junzi. Despite this capability (as in Confucius’ quote above), not everyone does become a junzi as it is the task of the human person to develop their moral sensibilities. The distinction between a junzi and a xiaoren is in their attitude towards moral education:

The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man.

From the above quote, it seems like thinking is tied to the heart and is directed at “the right view of things”; on the other hand, the xiaoren are locked only to the needs of their bodies. For Confucius, as well as Mencius, moral education is a school of benevolence (ren) and is responsible for the formation of junzi. What does moral education consist of?

**VIRTUE AND DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN**

The EsP curriculum identifies virtue ethics as a conceptual basis, but it fails to demonstrate how. Confucius identifies a methodology that can help in the formation of junzi; this is the doctrine of the mean. The doctrine of the mean constitutes a blueprint for the implementation of Confucian moral education. Similar to Aristotle’s mesotes, Confucius’ doctrine of the mean constitutes the spirit of harmony in-between the excessive and the deficient extreme. We read:

> While there are no stirrings of pleasure and anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of EQUILIBRIUM. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of HARMONY. This EQUILIBRIUM is the great root from which grow all the human actings in the world, and this HARMONY is the universal path which they all should pursue.

While Aristotle’s mesotes is about moderation in moral behavior, Confucius’ doctrine proposes harmony and the importance of equilibrium. In the Analects, Confucius speaks of this balance in terms of six virtues:

> While there are no stirrings of pleasure and anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of EQUILIBRIUM. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of HARMONY. This EQUILIBRIUM is the great root from which grow all the human actings in the world, and this HARMONY is the universal path which they all should pursue.

The above quote explains why learning without balance can harm one’s self and others. When living the doctrine of the mean, a person is required to seek and not just to possess virtues;

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31 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XVII, VIII, 3 in Ibid., 382.

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for him, the achievement of both is necessary as one without the other constitutes character flaws.

The doctrine of the mean works in the furtherance of benevolence (*ren*). Benevolence concerns reciprocal human relations, which has implications for moral education. For Confucius, benevolence is sensitive, empathetic, and considerate in treating others:

Tsze-kung said, “Suppose the case of a man extensively conferring benefits on the people, and able to assist all, what would you say of him? Might he be called perfectly virtuous?” The Master said, “Why speak only of virtue in connection with him? Must he not have the qualities of a sage? . . . Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves, that is what we might call the art of virtue.”

Fan Ch’ih asked about benevolence. The Master said, “It is to love all men.” He asked about knowledge. “It is to know all men.” Fan Ch’ih did not immediately understand these answers. The Master said, “Employ the upright and put aside all the crooked; in this way, the crooked can be made to be upright.”

While these quotes above refer to a beneficial, communal, and mutual relationship in the formation of benevolence, its core is care stemming from one’s own needs and feelings and requiring that the *junzi* empathize with and show consideration towards others. The object of benevolence is not selective; it is “to love all men” and “to know all men.”

For Confucius, benevolence must be interiorly willed by the people; as such, it is a consequence of a collective, striving to practice virtue. The superior man recognizes benevolence as constitutive of himself and, as such, values and protects it even at the expense of his very life.

For Mencius, benevolence is the outcome of moral education, which distinguishes the *junzi*:

In regard to inferior creatures, the superior man is kind to them, but not loving. In regard to people generally, he is loving to them, but not affectionate. He is affectionate to his parents, and lovingly disposed to people generally. He is lovingly disposed to people generally, and kind to creatures.

More nuanced than the mere appeal for universal love, Confucian levels of love recognize how persons love their family and kin first, before it concerns the care of other people who they are not directly related with. As such, we are only able to love others because we have loved our own kin and families; this constitutes recognizing in another person what we have recognized in our own families. As Mencius clarifies “[t]he benevolent, beginning with what they care for, proceed to what they do not care for.”

Mencius reinterprets Confucius’ understanding of filial piety, which only operates on the person, to a public morality that is necessary in order to foster benevolence. It is difficult to be impartial to everybody as persons always have greater concern toward one’s family and kin than other people. By arguing for the different levels of love, Mencius is able to articulate the psychological and emotional foundation for developing benevolence as a communal moral value— an outcome of moral education.

By arguing for benevolence, Mencius develops Confucius’ rule by morality. He suggests that leaders value and take care of people, and educate them about filial piety; he points to benevolence as the formula for good leadership. This supremacy—that is gained from the full support of the people—is called “the Kingly Way” (*wangdao*). To facilitate the kingly way, moral education plays a crucial role as it is centered

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For further reading:
on the cultivation of filial piety and communal love—practices that help people understand and value human relations. It is this way of dealing with others—generated from filial affections—that moral education is based on. As Mencius explains:

When looking at benevolence and its constitutive virtues, Mencius emphasizes the value of righteousness. Righteousness refers to the appropriate way of doing things. Considering the proper and ideal way as the benchmark, people feel shame; as a corrective, shame allows people to align their behavior with righteousness. A superior man feels this shame when he does something improper; shame prompts him to correct his inappropriate ways. Mencius speaks of the relationship between benevolence and righteousness in this way: “The richest fruit of benevolence is this, -- the service of one’s parents. The richest fruit of righteousness is this,--the obeying one’s elder brothers.”

Benevolence serves as an internal compass, whereas righteousness is an external signpost that guides various social relations; there is no conflict between and among them. If one’s action is benevolent, then it is righteous, and vice versa. Self-reflexivity is necessary, then, to see if one’s actions conform with the principle of righteousness and benevolence.

Similar to filial piety, righteousness plays an important role in arriving at benevolence and the development of a moral society; it serves as the standard of moral conduct appropriate to the virtue of benevolence. Righteousness serves as the moral acumen that motivates people to apply virtues very well: “The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain.”

Moral education nurtures the culture of filial piety and communal love; these are needed to attain the virtue of benevolence. As such, teaching filial piety and setting the social norm that respects the old and cares for the young are needed in actualizing this morality. But the process of instruction is interesting. Filial piety is not accomplished by mass indoctrination; instead, it is accomplished by the process of self-reflexivity, which includes the perfection of morality using the process of self-reflection. Because reflexivity involves the introspective examination of a person’s actions, it also claims that the right answers can be found within. As Mencius explains using the sages Tsâng and Tsze-sze, who act quite differently, if they “had exchanged places, each would have done as the other”.

For Mencius, self-reflexivity is the methodology for developing good consciences and discovering good capacities that are endowed by nature. Because persons are good, consciences are good intrinsically; as such, enabling people to distinguish good from bad. Good capacity refers to the quality of the heart that makes people act rightly, even without education. Despite these innate abilities, people need to capacitate their capacities; this explains the impetus to continuously engage in self-examination and reflexivity. As such, reflexivity is not only about the search for the right answers; it involves the retrieval of our good nature and the virtues of benevolence and righteousness. Confucius explains:

The superior man has nine things which are subjects with him of thoughtful consideration. In regard to the use of his ears, he is anxious to hear distinctly. In regard to his countenance, he is anxious that it should be benign. In regard to his demeanor, he is anxious that it should be respectful. In regard to his speech, he is anxious that it should be sincere. In regard to his doing business, he is anxious that it should be reverently careful. In regard to what he doubts about,
he is anxious to question others. When he is angry, he thinks of the difficulties (his anger may involve him in). When he sees gain to be got, he thinks of righteousness.39

Based on the quote above, moral education can not merely involve information dissemination; it includes the formation of persons and the development of qi. As such, it includes the development of a way of life coupled with the processes of moral learning. The heart is the source of good virtues and the organ endowed with the capacity to understand the same. Like the good conscience, the heart deteriorates because of some inordinate human desires; thus, the junzi is encouraged to nourish their heart by taming inordinate desires and practicing timeliness.40 The qi is developed by integrity; more so, if it is reinforced by moral principles.

The cultivation of benevolence is reducible to the tasks of practicing and learning moral principles. Moral education involves the harnessing of filial piety and righteousness, but it also includes the practice of moral principles such as faithfulness, credibility, and reciprocity. These practices demonstrate benevolence, which is essential for the development of a harmonious and virtuous society.

Faithfulness (zhong) can be found at the heart of benevolence; this virtue refers to one’s unquestionable loyalty to the leader but also includes sincerity in dealing with social relations. Unquestionable loyalty involves the condition of mutual respect and the development of a reciprocal relationship; respect begets respect. At the heart of faithfulness, as a moral principle, is sincerity towards others; this includes the genuine making of friends and an honest attitude towards others. The sincerity and honesty towards one’s friends and others allow people to give kind and faithful feedback about their faults; this also includes the humble acceptance of how one’s friends and others treat the advice. Confucius speaks of zhong in this way:

The philosopher Tsâng said, “I daily examine myself on three points: --whether, in transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful: --whether, in intercourse with friends, I may have been not sincere; -- whether I may have not mastered and practiced the instructions of my teacher.”41

The Master went out, and the other disciples asked, saying, “What do his words mean?” Tsâng said, “The doctrine of our master is to be true to the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to others—this and nothing more.”42

The Master said, “It is, in retirement, to be sedately grave; in the management of business, to be reverently attentive; in intercourse with others, to be strictly sincere. Though a man go among rude, uncultivated tribes, these qualities may not be neglected.43 Faithfulness, like benevolence, goes with another virtue—credibility (xin); it is xin that facilitates faithfulness. One’s credibility is crucial in one’s moral development; it is credibility that fosters social and communal life. As that which supports communal life, xin is inevitably a political virtue; the credibility of leaders emanates from their governments. As such, it is the virtue of credibility that assures the people of their well-being under a particular leader.

Tsze-hsiâ said, “If a man withdraws his mind from the love of beauty, and applies it as sincerely to the love of the virtuous; if, in serving his parents, he can exert his utmost strength; if in serving his prince, he can devote his life; if in his intercourse with his friends, his words are sincere:--although men say that he has not learned, I will certainly say that he has.”44

Another virtue that helps elucidate benevolence and is quite related to faithfulness is reciprocity

41 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” I, IV in Ibid., 126.
42 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” IV, XVI in Ibid., 166.
If faithfulness allows me to do my best to help others, then reciprocity is the desire to take the needs of others as one’s own. Shu provides the emotional and psychological foundation in dealing with others; with faithfulness, these virtues make possible the Confucian principles of treating other people. The value of reciprocity makes possible Confucius’ most famous teaching, “What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.” This Confucian teaching demands that people be treated well and with kindness, that they are taken care of and respected, and that they are protected and not harmed.

To understand the consequence of the moral education that Confucius puts forward, we need to look at his understanding of filial piety. Originally about practicing certain rites and respecting the old, being filial, for Confucius, means that “[i]n serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence, but does not abandon his purpose; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur.” Overcoming filial ritual, filial piety refers to principles of the heart and the practice of respect. This is not merely about providing pension for aged parents. As Confucius further remarked:

That parents, when alive, should be served according to propriety; that, when dead, they should be buried according to propriety; and that they should be sacrificed to according to propriety.

The filial piety of nowadays means the support of one’s parents. But dogs and horses likewise are able to do something in the way of support;—without reverence, what is there to distinguish the one support given from the other?

Moral education is about developing filial relations and encouraging communal love, but it entails more. Filial affection and fraternal duty include faithfulness to leaders; Confucius claims that “[t]he superior man bends his attention to what is radical. That being established, all practical courses naturally grow up. Filial piety and fraternal submission!—are they not the root of all benevolent actions?” Benevolence and other virtues sustain filial piety and foster affection toward one’s parents and kin and respect for others; this, in turn, produce faithful and loyal leaders. Instructing the citizens on the value of filial piety is a good way to maintain social order and stabilize the country.

The EsP curriculum identifies ethical decision-making, social and emotional learning, and career guidance as approaches to learning (dulog sa pagkatuto). By discussing the doctrine of the mean, I am able to provide a way of ethical decision-making quite similar to Aristotle’s phronesis, but focuses more on balance than mere harmony. As the method employed by Confucius, I demonstrated how the doctrine can help in determining the most appropriate way forward. By speaking of benevolence, righteousness, faithfulness, credibility, and reciprocity, I am able to provide a way of social and emotional learning through the identification of what is important and valuable personally and communally. And by looking at filial piety, I am able to provide a way of understanding career and vocation that is not separate from everyday and ordinary tasks nor insensitive to Asian familial ties, relationships, and dynamics.

RITUALS AND THE ARTS

Interestingly, Confucius considers the performance of certain rites and the playing

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45 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” XV, XXIII in Ibid., 351.
46 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” IV, XVIII in Ibid., 167.
47 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” II, V, 3 in Ibid., 137.

of music as modes that can facilitate moral education. The rites that Confucius refers to here are not always religious ones; they are often composed of civic performances denoting symbolic values, which cuts across complex social practices and norms. The performance of these rites and the engagement of music are important in upholding moral ideals and in fostering moral education.

Like the school flag ceremony, rites play a role in the formation of persons and good citizens. Rites are constitutive in the constitution of social norms and go beyond the worship of heaven and the respect of ancestors; embedded in the performance of these rites are social distinctions (such as social classes, gender, and social relations).

The Master said, “If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a man be without the virtues of humanity, what has he to do with music?”

Lin Fang asked what was the first thing to be attended to in ceremonies. The Master said, “A great question, indeed! In festive ceremonies, it is better to be sparing than extravagant. In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better that there be deep sorrow than a minute attention to the observances.”

The Master said, “High station filled without indulgent generosity; ceremonies performed without reverence; mourning conducted without sorrow: --wherewith should I contemplate such ways?”

The Master said, “Respectfulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes laborious bustle; carefulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes timidity; boldness, without the rules of propriety, becomes insubordination; straightforwardness, without the rules of propriety, becomes rudeness.”

The people are encouraged to practice the rites, but they are also demanded to go beyond the mere performance of rites. The rites are to reinforce their virtues and sustain filial and social positions and order—the rectification of names. Going beyond social order and organization, rites also facilitates the development of the doctrine of the mean, the attainment of benevolence, and its resultant harmony (or filial piety). As such, there is no point in social order without them. Rites and benevolence are correlatives. Rites are external manifestations of benevolence; whereas benevolence gives rites an inner morality. Rites facilitate the condition identified by the doctrine of the mean. In this context, it makes possible the development of harmonious relations and the reduction of social conflicts as persons focus on a communal outcome despite their desires and interests. In using rites for moral education, Confucius lays down a tangible method in the realization of the ideal of rule by morality.

But the purpose of cultivating social order can only be accomplished when appropriate music is incorporated into the practice of rites; an appropriate music is to arouse positive responses toward the social order. Confucius teaches:

The Master instructing the Grand music master of Lu said, “How to play music may be known. At the commencement of the piece, all the parts should sound together. As it proceeds, they should be in harmony while severally distinct and flowing without a break, and thus on to the conclusion.”

The Master said, “I returned from Wei to Lû, and then the music was reformed, and the pieces in the Royal songs and Praise songs found all their proper place.”

The above quotes demonstrate that rites and music are equally important, and they operate quite complementarily. Rites influence people’s moral behavior externally, whereas music internally affects their temperament and feeling.

50 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” III, III in Ibid., 147.
52 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” III, XXVI in Ibid., 159.
54 Confucius, “Confucian Analects,” III, XXIII in Ibid., 158.
both perfectly promote cultivation and moral development.

The third part of the paper articulated the Confucian way of concretely proceeding with moral education—that is, by way of the arts/humanities. By grounding the EsP discourse into personalism, it seems like they have transferred the core from psychology to philosophy; despite so, most of the classes and the approaches are still following those of values education. I am not saying that it is wrong; I just think it misses the point. It ignores the role of the arts in the formation of persons and the development of cultures, especially in an age that is so dominated by the sciences—natural or social. It is here that Confucius argues on the basis of the formation of persons.

CONCLUSION

Can Confucius provide a way of moral education that also supports the EsP program of the Department of Education? The answer is a resounding yes. By looking at the outcomes of the program and comparing it with the junzi, the paper is able to demonstrate similarities between the two; it seems even that the motivation of the junzi to moral cultivation is an internal and a more sustainable one. The same is true with the approaches to learning identified in the EsP curriculum; the doctrine of the mean, the different virtues and benevolence, and filial piety seem to present a more Asian way of proceeding. The doctrine of the mean that considers balance and harmony, the virtue of benevolence and its other resulting virtues, and filial piety resonate strongly with Filipino sensibility and our strong familial ties. Confucius does not demand that we abandon these, but grounds morality precisely on them. Lastly, Confucius’ recourse to rites and the arts can be a learning ground for those teaching the EsP as it remains an untapped potential in the formation of moral citizens. As such, the inclusion of Confucian, and even Asian or Filipino, ideals in the EsP conceptual framework is not only demanded but is necessitated, if we are to be successful in the formation of self-reflexive persons with very good filial relations and civic responsibility. Besides, it is not accidental that ren, often translated as benevolence and which is what the Confucian tradition is about, is translatable to Filipino as pagpapakatao.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


