“Bridging Faith and Knowledge through Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty*”

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Abstract

This paper argues that faith and knowledge are not mutually exclusive spheres of inquiry, but overlapping in a sense that faith is a viaduct of knowledge. Ludwig Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* is the major material in consideration to argue this case.

Wittgenstein’s religious inclination is examined in the first section to set some conditions on the possibility of interpretation laid out in this article. So this reading is in no way conclusive about the seminal material being considered. But in the second section, knowledge, belief, doubt and certainty are briefly discussed to ground the notion of religious convictions as hinge beliefs. The third section is an intentional derailment from the exposition of *On Certainty* in the mode of interpretation being suggested. It is about a personal academic experience wherein it is argued that, if the discussion in the second section is at least plausible, academic thinking needs not to be leaning towards the mutual exclusion of faith and knowledge. It is however premised on the necessity of faith as a hinge belief in the Wittgensteinian sense. It seems then that a religious world-picture driven by faith may not be separated from the one driven by science, which is a secular world-picture.

Keywords: Certainty, Religious Conviction, Faith, Knowledge

Introduction

In this contemporary society we live in wherein the scientific paradigm has been dominating as the basis of knowledge, having religious faith may seem not to be an intellectually viable option. Hence, the question if the idea of having ‘religious intellectuals’ who yield to scientific principles is just an oxymoron now arises.

Immediately, people from this circle react that this is never the case – much so that there has been an ongoing renaissance of discourses about God. This started to take place in the
1960s and the major proponents were not ordinary believers and theologians, but philosophers in the academia.¹

Now that it can be demonstrated that having faith cannot be simply consigned to irrationality, the case is now the exclusivity of secular thinking and religious conviction. Is it really the case that having faith and having knowledge are categorically different spheres of inquiry? It may seem so for many. But in this paper, I investigate on the peculiar notions of Ludwig Wittgenstein in his another posthumous work published as *On Certainty.*² Nevertheless, my expositions of this work cannot be considered conclusive because there are enormous substantial literature that may have been overlooked in the contents of this paper. Let it just be comments of a rather quick skimming of a very seminal material by this great philosopher.

This paper might not be too exhaustive an exposition of *OC* either. But I intend to argue that religious and secular world-pictures co-exist as overlapping rather than exclusive spheres. Hence the two these spheres of inquiry, one driven by faith and one driven by (empirical) knowledge, may be intricately interacting in a person’s epistemological convictions.


In the first section, I would like to situate Wittgenstein in the context of being (an)/a (ir)/religious person. This may give some preconditions on what he might have meant in some passages of *OC*. Though it is contestably anachronistic that Wittgenstein overtly established arguments for religious beliefs, I would like to posit the idea that these can be accommodated as hinge beliefs. In order to do this, I look at Wittgenstein’s differentiations of knowledge, belief, doubt and certainty in the second section. The third section is an intentional excursus about an experience wherein I had a viewpoint that I am warranted to believe, if my assertion in the previous section is at least plausible. Finally, I restate my argument as the denouement of the foregoing discussions of this paper. Viz., a religious world-picture driven by faith needs not to be exclusive of the one driven by science, which is a secular world-picture.

I. Wittgenstein, a religious person?

In Wittgenstein’s words to his friend, Maurice O’Connor Drury, he said that: “My type of thinking is not wanted in this present age; I have to swim so strongly against the tide… I am not a religious man, but I can’t help see every problem from a religious point of view.”\(^3\) This statement continues to puzzle many Wittgenstein scholars. Indeed Norman Malcolm in the beginning of his book started with this puzzlement saying that his understanding of Wittgenstein’s thoughts somehow got threatened. He was convinced that in the context of this conversation with Drury, Wittgenstein was not addressing issues of economy, society, politics, etc. Rather, Wittgenstein was referring to a

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As Wittgenstein’s own student, I say that there is much weight to this understanding of Malcolm. But interesting insights just cannot be brushed aside.

Wittgenstein was born into a family of Jewish descent but baptized and educated as a Roman Catholic. At the same time, he was influenced by Protestant and agnostic members of the family. Questions about religion might have really bothered him while growing up. This is not yet good reason to believe that he is a religious person though. In fact in a theological material that argues about Wittgenstein’s influence on Christian Theology, Tim Labron’s short biography of him seems to present a vague understanding about his religious inclination also. Aside from his comments about religion that are mostly about Christianity, no account would show that he intentionally meant to contribute to theological discourses and religious devotions. This is with the interesting exception of his comment on Johann Sebastian Bach’s piece: “‘To the glory of the most high God, and that my neighbor may be benefited thereby.’ That is what I would have liked to say about my work”

During World War I, Wittgenstein served the Austrian army and often volunteered to be at the front line, which is obviously a life-threatening position. He also always brought with him Leo Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief. It is during this season of his

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6 Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, pp.10-19.

7 Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology, p.19

life that he seemed to contemplate about the meaning of life, as written in his Notebooks on the 6th of July, 1916: “The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God. And connect with this the comparison of God to a father. To pray is to think about the meaning of life.”

Whatever he might mean about this life’s meaning seems to coincide with the time he was struggling with the logical principles rigidly laid down in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. However in the *TLP*, the statement “God does not reveal himself in the world” is what could be highlighted as his probable religious standpoint. But just as Brian Clack commented that in the *TLP*, religious language “does not get so far as to be false.” Wittgenstein implicitly just asserts that God-talk and religious language is outside the scope of the rigid notion of a meaningful *logical* discourse. In the *TLP*, it can be said that religious discourses are considered to be neither true nor false, but senseless.

Therefore in this section, it is most appropriate to suspend judgment about his religiosity. Suspension of judgment is never conclusive of course. But it is important to emphasize that it is not dismissive either. Wittgenstein might or might not have personal devotion to a personal divinity if that is what we mean by being religious. Ongoing researches prove to be highly necessary in arguing whatever the position one would be

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compelled to take. But apparently later in Wittgenstein’s life, Clack noted that he might have developed a more indifferent attitude towards religion in saying that, “Religion is not grounded in ratiocination, but is, rather, something like a way of responding to the world, a mode of orientation, or a way of living in the world.”

II. Religious Convictions as Hinge Beliefs

The previous section has the intention of preconditioning some interpretations in OC. And since Wittgenstein’s religiosity can be said to be tentative in the first place, I would like to highlight some passages in OC in this section to point out that beliefs in religious claims may be accommodated as hinge beliefs in the Wittgensteinian sense. I do this by first establishing that the conditions of knowing and believing coincide as mental states. Then ‘believing’ as a mental state is more likely to be understood as a subjective certainty. It is followed up by the idea that being subjectively certain is more apt than knowing in particular circumstances. But lastly, in these circumstances, a “nonepistemic” subjective assimilations or certainty may be considered hinge beliefs necessary for practicality.

II.1. Knowing and Believing

Knowing, believing, doubting and being certain are indeed concepts extrapolated in the book. Interestingly, these concepts are also entailed in religious convictions. But let me start with OC 13 wherein Wittgenstein characterizes, say:

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13 Clack, Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion, p.82. It seems that to identify Wittgenstein’s religiosity is more difficult to identify than him being an ethical thinker. As I have argued elsewhere, one may take an ethical tract in interpreting his writings. But this topic is not the thrust of this paper.
a = “I know it is so”
b = “It is so”
c = “He knows…”

It seems that c counts as knowledge;\textsuperscript{14} while a does not as it implies a degree of almost just believing. One cannot perfectly infer b from a because b exemplifies an objective state as it is, whereas saying a is not a proof that one knows something (cf. OC 487) unless it is backed up by evidences (cf. OC 504). The case in c is different from a because “he does know takes some shewing” (OC 14).

One says “I know when one is ready to give compelling grounds. “I know” relates to a possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light, assuming that he is convinced of it.

But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes. (OC 243, Italics mine.)

The foregoing train of thought is highly relevant for religious beliefs. But the question now is, is the believer able to provide grounds for certain beliefs that are surer than his mental state of conviction? It seems that this cannot be so. But it is still important to highlight how knowing and believing coincide as mental states.

In OC 175-177, it says

“I know it” I say it to someone else; and here there is a justification. But there is none for my belief.

Instead of “I know it” one may say in some cases “That’s how it is – rely upon it.” In some cases, however “I learned it years and years ago”; and sometimes: “I am sure it is so.”

What I know, I believe.

\textsuperscript{14} I say that it counts as knowledge because it has the same epistemological status as b. For example, a given proposition d says that “I know c” is just the same epistemological status as a
Apparently, it cannot be seen in this passage that even though knowledge is in need of justification and grounds, it explicitly asserts that knowledge does not coincide with belief. In fact, the latter statement points out that knowing entails believing, but surely not the other way around. But “the sentence ‘I know…’ expresses the readiness to believe certain things” (OC 330). So it seems that though knowing and believing may have different mental states epistemologically, they still coincide as mental states of conviction ontologically. That is, to say that one believing \( p \) is being convinced that he knows \( p \) (even if it may turn out to be false); while knowing is also being convinced that one needs to be open to \( p \) that he would then be inclined to judge as true or false.

Moreover, even if it can be said that one knows just as if it is \( c \) (above), it is still different from knowledge if “the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion” (OC 243). Then one falls back to a state of conviction where, as I am pointing out, knowing and believing coincide. I shall go back to this after briefly discussing Wittgenstein’s notions of subjective and objective certainty.

**II.2. Subjective Certainty and Objective Certainty**

Wittgenstein differentiates two kinds of certainties: one that is subjective, which is based on belief; and one that is objective, which is based on knowledge. In OC 194 he says,

With the word “certain” we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. That is subjective certainty.

But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn’t mistake be logically excluded?

“[T]he only objective certainty that would be categorically distinct from knowledge,” as Danièle Moyal-Sharrock explains it, “is a certainty which would not depend on
justification.”¹⁵ As in OC 195 for example, it is objectively certain that there was no mistake made by me while sitting in my room if anybody accuses me of making a particular mistake when I was only thought or supposed to be sitting in my room while the truth is, I am not. It is a certainty that is distinct from knowledge but needs no justification.¹⁶

But what’s more important to my discussion is subjective certainty. In OC 245 (even if he already distinguished certainty from knowledge in the preceding paragraphs) he says,

There is no subjective sureness that I know something. The certainty is subjective, but not the knowledge.” Subjective certainty may be a firm conviction in the absence of doubt. It is still not knowledge, nonetheless. But it is surely just like any other religious belief.

Even if “subjective sureness” does not immediately count as knowledge, consequently, this kind of certainty is believing. Wittgenstein even emphasizes that it is “just like any other religious belief.”

II.3. Being Certain and Knowing (revisited)

In later paragraphs of OC just like in 415, Wittgenstein seems to move a step further by letting the mental states of knowing and being certain meet head on as both problematic, but pinning down ‘knowing’:

…isn’t the use of the word “know” as a preeminently philosophical word altogether wrong? If “know” has this interest, why not “being certain”?


¹⁶ Objective certainty is not so important in my argument anyway so there is probably no need to use further examples about this other than what Wittgenstein tries to explain subsequently. But an understanding could be aided with the basic assumption of OC 16.
Apparently because it would be too subjective. But isn’t “know” *just* as subjective? Isn’t one misled simply by the grammatical peculiarity that “p” follows from “I know p”?

“Know” is just as subjective as “being certain” because of the grammatical peculiarity that ‘p’ follows from ‘I know p’.” To say that one knows *p* is to be committed to a very particular grammar (in the Wittgensteinian sense of a “language-game”) that I shall point out briefly later.

One can say “certain beyond all reasonable doubt” (*OC* 416). Just as in the court of law, a particular language-game, “I am certain” could replace ‘I know’ in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine it being forbidden to say ‘I know’ there (*OC* 8).

Actually, the comment of “being forbidden to say ‘I know’” is very interesting. Going back to what was said just slightly above about grammar, it seems to tell us that there is a commitment to the grammatical peculiarity of testifying that the facts are “different from what he knew.” This tells us about the rigidity of the use of ‘I know’ as it follows the grammar in the particular language-game of epistemic convictions.\(^\text{17}\)

Thus I should say that there’s a sense in which knowledge and certainty are on a par in terms of epistemic commitments. Thereby making extensions that scientific assumptions are just on a par with religious convictions. Besides, in the intellectual milieu of the writing of *OC*, the attitude to knowledge could be attributed to the post-Enlightenment attitude of explaining as D.Z. Phillips commented. He says that this post-Enlightenment inclination that when civilized people accuse primitive people of

\(^{17}\) Even if “I am certain” becomes the replacement in such a statement, it has an assumption that the usage should be “I know,” only that it is “forbidden.” Therefore the following of a grammatical rule is implied in the statement “I know” and it is in itself subjective.
superstition, the civilized are themselves in the grip of primitive superstition. Their appeal to always have an explanation of things is itself idle because there could be other factors to look at holistically, and then acquire new categories. As OC 211 states, “it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.”

Whatever the standard of knowing is, whether be it the scientific criteria or religious convictions (perhaps even superstitions), the certainty established “has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.” And to doubt it only “gives oneself a false picture of doubt” (OC 249). It is because as one doubts, one is not just doubting a single notion but a whole system of intricate knowledge. Then the scaffolding of thoughts either weaken or collapse completely.

II.4. Hinges as ‘Nonepistemic’ Certainty

Being “certain beyond reasonable doubt” surely reverberates prior assertions on these scaffolding of thoughts and OC 246 – 249:

Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs. This position I will hold…

What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands? Why can’t I imagine it at all? What would I believe if I didn’t believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist.

I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.

One gives oneself a false picture of doubt.

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Arriving at an irreversible belief seems to be like arriving at other beliefs demonstrated in *OC*. These are beliefs on the existence of the external world (very evident in Wittgenstein’s comments to Moore’s assertions), the reality of the past (e.g. assumptions on the earth’s existence in time and anecdotes on Napoleon, etc.), the presence of other minds (situating the “I” and “he” propositions), mathematical propositions, absoluteness of colours, etc. Indeed to believe otherwise would simply assert irrationality on the doubter. I say that even religious convictions are irreversible beliefs as such (*OC* 245).

Nevertheless, it is also important to note that in the two kinds of certainty identified by Baron Reed, namely: psychological and epistemic, “it is hard to see the kind of certainty [Wittgenstein] characterized as being epistemic, rather than merely psychological.”19 But since this seems to *really* be the case in *OC*, it cannot be said that I have conflated these certainties as I have identified above. Indeed there is no reason to suppose that these contemporary nuances could be (anachronistically) attributed to Wittgenstein. What seems to only be difficult for him is the difficulty in realizing “the groundlessness of our believing” (*OC* 166).

In spite of this difficulty, Wittgenstein strongly pointed out in *OC* 343-344:

"We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. My life consists in my being content to accept many things."

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OC is a difficult material to read not just because the extrapolations are very comprehensive and intricate. But because it seeks to ground knowledge and certainty to a firm foundation in the intellectual milieu of the proliferation of science and philosophical discourse of skepticism and idealism. But the abovementioned passage resonates a seeming assumption in OC 253-254 that, “At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded” and followed up by, “Any ‘reasonable’ person behaves like this.”

Moreover, the pursuit is aided by what Wittgenstein posited about the ‘hinges’ of a door. By saying that the “the hinges must stay put” for the door to turn, he asserts that certain ‘hinges’ are necessary in every practical situation of our lives. It is the case with our assumptions about the use of mathematics for daily living (OC 655). Moyal-Sharrock identifies this kind of hinges as “nonepistemic assimilation or certainty.” Just as the hinges must stay put for the door to turn, so is the language-game that appears as nonepistemic certainty. “It is there – like our life” (OC 559).

The very object and subject of religious claims is God. It is the foundation and ground for every religious belief. But as implied in OC 436, God is never bound by our knowledge. Therefore, religious claims for Wittgenstein may be considered as nonepistemic assimilations or certainty. I say that these are, nonetheless, hinges that must also stay put.

III. Faith as Viaduct of Knowledge


In this section, I would like to share an experience I had during a training engagement in my university just a few months ago. There was one assertion by the facilitator that some claims need to be taken by faith. Though I really have no problem with that notion, it seems to imply that faith and knowledge are incompatible.

With the position I am taking in the preceding section, I would like to emphasize here that what’s mutually exclusive to faith is not knowledge but *sight*. Having empirical evidences is more linked with having sight. But a thinking person does not need the full availability of empirical evidences in order to be rational. In fact faith needs to be supplemented due to the unavailability of full epistemic access. Consequently, one needs to be rational in one’s pursuit of scholarship. But it does not follow that since empirical evidences are not fully available, faith and knowledge are incompatible. It’s actually a *non sequitur*. How does one go from the premise that “empirical evidences are not fully available” to the faith-knowledge incompatibility conclusion? It seems to me that it would take a huge leap for this to have certain warrant.

In fact, I would like to contend that the case is otherwise: that faith and knowledge are indeed compatible due to the unavailability of full empirical evidences. As knowledge about hinge beliefs, etc. were established in the previous section, I argue that this is as Wittgenstein says that “Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it” (*OC* 410). Hence, it cannot be assumed that the readers of this paper would warrant the plausibility of the system of argumentation I lay out. But let me just present this simple argument to demonstrate how

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22 As implied in 2 Corinthians 5:7 and Hebrews 11:1.
I move from the premise that “empirical evidences are not fully available” to the conclusion that “faith and knowledge are indeed compatible.”

FKC1 Empirical evidences are not fully available (cf. OC 212-213)

FKC2 Faith is “complete trust or confidence in someone or something”\(^{23}\) (this I regard to be a subjective certainty)

FKC3 Knowledge are “facts, information and skills acquired by a person”\(^{24}\)

FKC4 Knowledge is also “awareness or familiarity gained by experience”\(^{25}\) (cf. OC 111, 161)

FKC5 It is necessary for a rational person to have FKC3 and FKC4

FKC6 By FKC5, FKC3 is assumed to be acquired in spite of FKC1

FKC7 Both FKC4 and FKC6 can only be attained by asserting FKC2

\[ \therefore \text{ Faith and knowledge are supplementary and compatible}\]

Perhaps what needs to be explained is the distinction between the two definitions of knowledge above. FKC3 seems to be objective as an external factor, whereas FKC4 is subjective. However, FKC3 cannot be fully acquired due to FKC1. Hence, there is a need to incorporate FKC2 so as to be convinced to/about someone laying down a purported

\(^{23}\) Directly lifted from the New Oxford American Dictionary, version 2.2.2, 2017. I just used the first definition because the second one strongly asserts religious beliefs. In fact, I do not want to use the biblical definition of faith that it is the “substance of things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1). Though this bible verse supports my assertion that what is incompatible with faith is sight and not reason, I would rather use the first definition of the dictionary cited because it is consistent with the reference of the proceeding ones.

\(^{24}\) New Oxford American Dictionary.

\(^{25}\) New Oxford American Dictionary.
objective fact or something that sets the states of affairs. Even apart from religious convictions, this is true in every acquisition of knowledge and scientific discoveries.

Or let me recast the argument by composing FKI propositions asserting the incompatibility of faith and knowledge:

FKI1  Empirical evidences are not fully available
FKI2  *Faith is incompatible to knowledge*
FKI3  Thus, FKC2 (above) cannot be used alongside the premises on reason
FKI4  Knowledge are “facts, information and skills acquired by a person”
FKI5  Knowledge is also “awareness or familiarity gained by experience”
FKI6  It is necessary for a rational person to have FKI4 and FKI5
FKI7  FKI4 is untenable due to FKI1 and FKI3
FKI8  FKI5 will have insufficient bases because of FKI2

∴ One may dispute that faith and knowledge is incompatible.

As one exercises faith even in scholarship, it does not discredit one’s scholarship. Needless to say that FKC2 is the driving force of every thinking person, even of scientists. The claim on the incompatibility that I am trying to challenge seems to assert that when something is taken by faith, it is seemingly not an intellectually viable position in the strictest sense. One may only find this recent assertion problematic if by “intellectually viable position in the strictest sense” we mean meeting the scientific standards. However, I find this recent claim problematic also because to be intellectually viable *does not exactly mean* to be scientific. In fact that view simply resembles
scientism, which is actually the exact counterpart of fideism (a position that I am also not willing to take).²⁶

I would like to use the metaphor of a viaduct to end this section. A viaduct is “a high bridge that carries a road or railroad over an area that is difficult to cross, such as a deep valley, very wet land, or the steep side of a hill.”²⁷ It seems to me that faith claims, as hinge propositions or nonepistemic assimilations, are what allows us to traverse an investigation for knowledge to be acquired. It may simply be taken for granted that we take as true just like the insights that are found in text-books, or the table and apparatus that are left unnoticed in terms of its existence in tests and experiments (OC 162-163). But faith nevertheless hangs over knowledge that may seem difficult to cross.

Conclusion

Just like hinges that are attached into two distinct surfaces: one at the side of the door itself and one at the door frame, I say that (objective) certainty is the hinge that joins together faith and knowledge. Therefore, it seems to me that a religious world-picture driven by faith is not exclusive of the a secular world-picture driven by science.

I end with Wittgenstein’s own statement that,

²⁶ Scientism as defined by the New Oxford American Dictionary is not just “thought or expression as characteristic of scientists.” To an extent, it is an “excessive belief in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques. Fideism also has the same extreme case only to the opposite direction as “every knowledge depends on faith or revelation.” Moreover, this extreme view is just exactly Phillips remark above on note 18.

²⁷ https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/viaduct

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not the kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

Now I am certain that Wittgenstein advocated justification by works. But it is not in the language-game of Christian theology. It is in the language-game of a subtle relationship between epistemology and ethics that, as one claims to know, “he does know takes some shewing” (OC 14). But this surely requires another investigation.

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*E-sources*


