Iris Marion Young’s Theory of Structural Justice and Collective Responsibility

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Young was born in 1949 in New York City and grew up in the culturally diverse setting of Astoria, in the borough of Queens. Her father died when she was very young, while her polyglot mother worked as an interpreter for the United Nations. After earning her degree in Queens College in 1970, she pursued her master’s and doctor’s degrees in philosophy at the Pennsylvania State University. There she met a graduate student in economics, David Alexander, who later on would become her husband. After earning her doctor’s degree in 1974, based on a dissertation on Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), she taught philosophy and political theory in Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Miami University and University of Pittsburgh. In 1999 she moved to the University of Chicago as a professor of political science. She was an active member of the Radical Philosophy Association, the Society for Women in Philosophy, and the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.

Standing on the philosophies and theories of such thinkers as Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), John Rawls (1921-2002), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Jurgen Habermas (born: 1929), Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013), and John Roemer (born: 1945), Young focused her philosophizing on gender, race, justice, equality, democracy, globalization and international relations, while immersing herself in activism and political organization. It was her 1990 book Justice and the Politics of Difference that gave her the international reputation as a political philosopher. This work was followed by six more books: “Throwing like a Girl” and other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory of 1990, Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and Policy of 1997, Inclusion and Democracy of 2000, On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and other Essays of 2004, Global Challenges: War, Self Determination and Responsibility for Justice of 2007, and the posthumously published Responsibility
for Justice of 2011 that was prepared by her husband, Alexander.

As an attestation to her international reputation, some of her works had been translated to more than twenty languages such as Croatian, Japanese, German, Italian, Portuguese, Slovakian, Spanish and Swedish. Her fellowships and visiting professorships required her to travel to Austria, Australia, South Africa, Germany and New Zealand. In 2006, Young died at her home at the age of 57, after more than a year of struggle against throat cancer. This section on her theory of structural justice and collective responsibility is based on a close reading of four of her seven books: Justice and the Politics of Difference; Inclusion and Democracy; Global Challenges: War, Self Determination and Responsibility for Justice; and Responsibility for Justice. These four books were chosen after setting aside the ones that were more focused on gender and feminism. All of these four selected books are collections of inter-locking essays, presented as chapters, on various themes instead of monographs dealing with single argumentative lines.

The book Justice and the Politics of Difference of 1990 is composed of eight chapters and an epilogue and addresses such themes as: the implications of the contentions of the left leaning social movements in America to political philosophy; the implication of postmodernism to political philosophy and philosophy in general; the rooting of traditional socialist discourses on equality and democracy on the late twentieth century politics and theory; and the present day notion of social justice as implied by these social movements and theories. The first chapter, entitled “Displacing the Distributive Paradigm,” argues that the current discourses on distributive justice is not sufficient to cover the totality of the concept of justice as these tend to emphasize the distribution of material goods. Young suggests that side by side with these discourses, justice should be tackled in terms of a given society’s decision making processes, division of labor; and division of culture, with the concepts of oppression and domination as key categories.

The second chapter, entitled “Five Faces of Oppression,” examines in more detail the manifestations of oppression in contemporary American society, in which Young identifies five main aspects: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. In this chapter Young proffers her analytic concept of the social group as the recipient or agent of
such forms of oppressions. The third chapter, entitled “Insurgency and the Welfare Capitalist Society,” critiques the welfare state that represses the political discussions of its policies by relegating such discussions to the jurisdiction of the policy experts instead of opening it to the public sphere to be threshed out more thoroughly. The fourth chapter, entitled “The Ideal of Impartiality and the Civic Public,” delves into the ideal of impartiality to uncover that its tendency to see society as composed of homogenous individuals instead of groups with different needs and conditions could be the root of unjust policies and practices. The fifth chapter, entitled “The Scaling of Bodies and the Politics of Identity,” uses Julia Kristeva (born: 1941) notion of abject to analyze the connection between a given society’s criteria on the beautiful, the ugly, the clean and the filthy on one hand, and its racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism and ableism on the other hand.

The sixth chapter, entitled “Social Movements and the Politics of Difference,” presents a pathway towards liberation and social equality that is founded on the affirmation of group differences instead of on the unrealistic insistence on social homogeneity. The seventh chapter, entitled “Affirmative Action and the Myth of Merit,” supports affirmative action and critiques the assumptions of meritocracy that is supposedly undermined by a given society’s option for affirmative action. Young sees affirmative action not as a compensatory mechanism for the past injustices but as an enabling system to overcome oppression. The eighth chapter, entitled “City Life and Difference,” resists the homogenizing force of the city and proffers that instead of unity the city should be more sensitive to heterogeneity. Young presents her four virtues of her envisioned city life: social differentiation without exclusion, variety, eroticism, and publicity. The epilogue, entitled “International Justice,” yearns that her findings for the society and the city should also be projected to the global community.

The book Inclusion and Democracy of 2000 is composed of seven chapters and addresses such themes as: “the differences and conflicts that generate problems for which authoritative decision-making seeks solutions; the meaning and role of public discussion in decision-making; the nature of political representation both through formal institutions and in civil society; as well as structural, communicative, and jurisdictional impediments to political
equality and fair outcomes” (Young 2000, 4). The first chapter, entitled “Democracy and Justice,” grapples with the question “what are the norms and conditions of inclusive democratic communication under circumstances of structural inequality and cultural difference?” (Young 2000, 6). Young places her hopes on deliberative democracy as a mechanism for attaining justice while critiquing its shortcomings and flaws. The second chapter, entitled “Inclusive Political Communication,” tackles the same question tackled by the preceding chapter and looks into some forms of political communication that are otherwise overshadowed by the idealized form of orderly and dispassionate argumentation. Specifically, Young examines here the communicative forms of greeting or public acknowledgement, rhetoric, and narrative. The third chapter, entitled “Social Difference as a Political Resource,” deals with the same question dealt with by the two preceding chapters and critiques the ideal that political communication should aim always at the common good, as oftentimes this would result to the marginalization of the interests of the less powerful groups.

The fourth chapter, entitled “Representation and Social Perspective,” engages with the question “how should inclusive democratic communication and decision-making be theorized for societies with millions of people?” (Young 2000, 6). Young disagrees with the idea that representative democracy would always be thin democracy and could never be a participative or deep democracy. In this chapter, Young explored the mechanisms and ways in which active and inclusive participation can be achieved in the modern day representative democracy. The fifth chapter, entitled “Civil Society and Its Limits,” responds to the same question responded to by the preceding chapter and more specifically explored the potentials of the civil society, the public sphere and some government institutions as mechanisms and avenues for the achievement of a more participative and inclusive democracy within the reigning representative democratic model. The sixth chapter, entitled “Residential Segregation and Regional Democracy,” addresses the question “what is the proper scope of the democratic polity, and how are exclusions enacted by restricting that scope?” (Young 2000, 6). Young studies the effects of racial and class segregations, as well as the of the insistence of politically delineating the metropolis into its constituent cities, to deliberative democracies, as this would exclude
individuals and groups within a given polity. The seventh chapter, entitled “Self-Determination and Global Democracy,” grapples with the same question grappled by the preceding chapter and argues that in the age of globalization and interdependency deliberative democracy should also be instituted in the international setting.

The book Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and Responsibility for Justice of 2007 is composed of nine chapters and addresses such themes as: self-determination, war and violence, and global justice. The first chapter, entitled “Hybrid Democracy: Iroquois Federalism and the Postcolonial Project,” proceeds on the theme of self-determination and studies the historical confederation of the six Iroquois nations, namely Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora, in order to glean some lessons on how to conceptualize modern day models for the interaction of nations and states. The second chapter, entitled “Two Concepts of Self-Determination,” still on the theme of self-determination, compares and contrasts the concept of self-determination that is based on the idea of non-interference, and self-determination that is based on the idea of non-domination. Young proffers that self-determination based on non-domination is a viable model for a federal interaction among nations and states at the global context. The third chapter, entitled “Self-Determination as Non-Domination: Ideals Applied to Palestine/Israel,” still on the theme of self-determination, explores further the concept of self-determination based on the idea of non-domination. Young makes a distinction between the more common model of federalism that puts emphasis on the vertical relations among the self-determining entities and the central government, and her preferred model of federalism that puts emphasis on the horizontal relations among self-determining entities. She suggests that this preferred model of federalism could be a viable model to resolve the conflict between Palestine and Israel. The fourth chapter, entitled “Power, Violence and Legitimacy: A Reading of Hannah Arendt in an Age of Police Brutality and Humanitarian Intervention,” works on the theme of war and violence, and analyzes the hidden injustice involved in the intrusion of NATO in Serbia, without the UN authorization, using the distinction made by Arendt on legitimacy and justification as its framework. The fifth chapter, entitled “Envisioning a Global Rule of Law,” still on war and violence, is a collaborative work with the Italian economic and political theorist
Daniele Archibugi (born: 1958). The authors critique the military response of the United States of America in Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 terror attacks, and instead lay down an alternative plan of action that is based on the rule of law and international co-operation as an effective long term address to the problem of terrorism.

The sixth chapter, entitled “The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State,” still on the theme of war and violence, presents a parallelism between a government at war, that over aggressively protects its citizens both from external threats of violence and internal threats of dissent, and a patriarch that protects his women and children and exacts from them their total obedience. Young argues that just as these women and children would want to insist on their autonomy and rights, the citizens of a government at war should also be allowed to express their autonomy and rights. The seventh chapter, entitled “De-Centering the Project of Global Democracy,” still on the theme of war and violence, builds on Habermas’ notion of the public sphere and proposes that deliberative democracy is not merely based on a face to face dialogue but could involve a multiplicity of fora that may be scattered across space and time. Young thinks that a de-centered deliberative democracy could be more easily adapted in the global context as a norm of interaction between nations and states. The eighth chapter, entitled “Reflections on Hegemony and Global Democracy,” still on the theme of war and violence, angrily reflects on the war in Iraq and represents President George W. Bush as a global dictator in order to contrasts with its vision of putting up a global democratic order where people from different races, nations and states can effectively represent themselves whenever transnational issues and concerns are being discussed and planned. The ninth chapter, entitled “Responsibility, Social Connection, and Global Labor Justice,” runs on the theme of global justice, uncovers the structural injustice involved in the global sweatshop system, where clothing items that are marketed and consumed in the first world setting are often manufactured in the poorer countries under sub-human conditions and circumstances. Young’s idea of social connection demonstrates to the people of the first world their complicity in the perpetration of these sweatshops and their duty to alleviate the conditions and circumstances in such sweatshops.
The book Responsibility for Justice of 2011, with a foreword by the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (born: 1947), is composed of seven chapters and addresses such themes as: economic inequalities in the United States of America and in the world, how people conceptualize poverty, structural injustice, and the distinction between guilt and responsibility. The first chapter, entitled “From Personal to Political Responsibility,” critiques the thoughts of the American libertarian political theorist Charles Murray (born: 1943) and American scholar on poverty and welfare Lawrence Mead (born: 1943) that tend to blame the poor for their poverty. Young argues that by doing so, these two theorists swayed our attention from looking at the injustices embedded in the social structure. Young proposes that the analysis of structural injustice need not end up in a useless blame game but in a proactive situation wherein citizens acknowledge their share political responsibilities to rectify such structural injustices. The second chapter, entitled “Structure as the Subject of Justice,” demonstrates that poverty cannot be sufficiently analyzed and addressed using an interpretive frame that only emphasizes individual responsibility and not structural injustices and inequalities. By talking about the life a woman named Sandy, a single parent who could not find an affordable and appropriate housing for herself and her children, Young illustrates that in some cases we could not even pinpoint the exact causes of individual poverty, as the aspects of a complex system may only be just contributing one tiny circumstance each to effect such poverty. The third chapter, entitled “Guilt versus Responsibility: a Reading and Partial Critique of Hannah Arendt,” looks at the distinction made by Arendt on guilt and responsibility and puts forward the idea that even if a citizen cannot be pinpointed as guilty of instituting or perpetrating a structural injustice, such a citizen can still be responsible in working towards the elimination of such an injustice. The fourth chapter, entitled “A Social Connection Model,” returns to the story of Sandy and examines her situation using the Arendtian distinction on guilt and responsibility. The fifth chapter, entitled “Responsibility across Borders,” projects the social connection model, that she discussed in the domestic context of the life of Sandy and the poverty and inequalities in the United States of America, unto the global context to make us all realize of our shared responsibility to grapple with the structural inequalities that exist in
the interaction among nations and states. The sixth chapter, entitled “Avoiding Responsibility,” explores the different ways and practice through which people brush aside their responsibility to act against structural injustices and inequalities. Young mentions four such ways and practices: reification, denial of connection, heading the demands of immediacy, and the “that is not my job” attitude. The seventh chapter, entitled “Responsibility and Historic Injustice,” re-reads Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) surprising call for a forgetting of the past colonial wrongs in order for the colonized to focus on the present and futural tasks of inventing his new identity. Young claims that Fanon is basing his call on a liability model of responsibility. But by offering her own social connection model of responsibility, she proposes a more effective and acceptable approach in dealing with the historic injustice suffered by the black Americans.

In as far Young’s theory of structural justice and collective responsibility is concerned, these four books contain the following key themes: 1) Young’s theory of structural justice, which may be subdivided into a) her critique of the distributive model of justice, b) her proposed alternative structural model of justice, and c) her strategies in addressing structural evil; 2) Young’s theory of collective responsibility; 3) her call for a global discourse on justice; and 4) her views on the applicability of her theories to the analysis of justice in other countries. These themes and sub-themes are discussed in more details in the following sub-sections.

THEORY OF STRUCTURAL JUSTICE

As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Young’s theory of structural justice may be discussed under the headings of her critique of the distributive model of justice, her proposed alternative structural model of justice, and her envisioned strategies in addressing structural injustices. The bulk of these ideas are contained in her books Justice and the Politics of Difference, and Inclusion and Democracy.

Critique of the Distributive Model of Justice

Young’s critique of the distributive model of justice is primarily found in the essay “Displacing the Distributive Paradigm”
from the book Justice and the Politics of Difference. It starts with the claim that contemporary philosophical discourses on justice had narrowly focused on distributive justice at the expense of the themes that may not be covered by such model of justice. Under this model, social justice is defined as “the morally proper distribution of social benefits and burdens among society’s members,” where benefits and burdens are mainly understood as “wealth, income, and other material resources” but is often stretched to include nonmaterial entities such as “rights, opportunity, power, and self-respect” (Young 1990, 16). Young explains that this understanding of social justice can be found in the writings of such thinkers as the American philosopher Rawls, the British historical sociologist W. G. Runciman (born: 1934), the American constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman (born: 1943), the American governance and policy scholar William Galston (born: 1946), the British political theorist David Miller (born: 1946), the American economist Edward Nell (born: 1935), the British philosopher Onora O’Neill (born: 1941), the American-Canadian philosopher Kai Nielsen (born: 1926), and the American philosopher Michael Walzer (born: 1935) (Cf. Young 1990, 16-18).

But empirically speaking, social justice as distributive justice cannot thoroughly make sense out of some demands and clamour from some of the recent social movements in the United States of America. Young cites five examples: a rural town in Massachusetts rallying against a state decision to set up a hazardous waste treatment plant in the locality; a city in Ohio being outraged by a major employer’s sudden announcement of the closure of its plant pulling almost half of the city out of employment; some Black critics complaining about the unfair stereotyping of Black Americans in popular culture; a similar grievance from some Arab Americans; and some organizations of clerical workers arguing against their plight of spending the entire working day encoding mindless numbers and data (Cf. Young 1990, 19-20). Young emphasizes that the distribution of goods or burdens is simply not the issue in these appeals for justice in contemporary America.

More important than these empirical counter-proofs, Young delves into the philosophical problems and implications of the distributive model of justice as the sole model for social justice, where she finds two major ones. The first one of these is that the
model would tend to limit the discussion of social justice to the allocation of material goods, like things, resources, incomes, wealth, social positions, and jobs (Young 1990, 15). This preoccupation with material things, Young claims, would prevent us from asking the more radical question of what are the social structures and institutional contexts that cause the current pattern of distribution of such material goods. A society may spend all its energy, resources and time in trying to come up with the situation where the goods and burdens are fairly distributed among its members, but if its social structures and institutional contexts have the tendency to favour some groups over other groups, sooner or later the situation would slide back to its starting point where there is no fair distribution of goods and burdens.

The second philosophical problem and negative implication of the distributive model of justice as the sole model for social justice springs from the efforts of some political theorists to stretch the coverage of distribution from mainly involving material goods and burdens to something that would include non-material goods and burdens, such as rights, power, opportunity, and self-respect (Cf. Young 1990, 16). Young argues that treating these non-material goods and burdens as something distributable just like the material goods and burdens would in the end distort their very nature. Once power, for example, is conceptualized as something distributable, this would reify it and make it something inert (Cf. Young 1990, 30-33). Young agrees with Foucault that power should be more effectively thought of as something inter-relational and active. Once opportunity, as another example, is examined as something distributable, this would mislead us to think opportunity can be given to those with less opportunity as easily as handing them packages or bundles of goods. Instead, having or not having opportunity is the result of some “rules and practices that govern one’s action, the way other people treat one in the context of specific social relations, and the broader structural possibilities produced by the confluence of a multitude of actions and practices” (Young 1990, 26).

Hence, whether social justice talks about material or non-material goods and burdens, it becomes clear that the distributive model of justice is not sufficient to tackle all the issues about social justice. This is the main reason why Young proposes for a more structural and dynamic analysis of social justice that would
complement the short comings of the distributive model of justice. But at this early point she already makes it known that her structural analysis of justice goes beyond the Marxist focus on the analysis of the modes of production, as this would include “any structures or practices, the rules and norms that guide them, and the language and symbols that mediate social interactions within them, in institutions of state, family, and civil society, as well as the workplace” (Young 1990, 22).

**Alternative Structural Model of Justice**

Young’s structural and dynamic analysis of justice is at the heart of her theories of justice and collective responsibility and this can be primarily found in the essays “Five Faces of Oppression” from the book Justice and the Politics of Difference; and “From Personal to Political Responsibility” and “Structure as the Subject of Justice” from the book Responsibility for Justice. As her theory is structural, it is but expected that her analysis would focus on collectivities rather than individuals; but as her theory is also post-Marxist, it is but expected that such collectivities should not be the social classes of Marx. Young, therefore, introduces the “social group” as her main analytic concept while admitting that social theory and philosophy have yet to develop this concept more fully (Young 1990, 43). She defines “social group” as: “a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life. Members of a group have a specific affinity with one another because of their similar experience or way of life, which prompts them to associate with one another more than with those not identified with the group” (Young 1990, 43). For her example of social groups, she enumerates: “women and men, age groups, racial and ethnic groups, religious groups, and so on” (Young 1990, 42-43).

To further sharpen her concept of the social group she contrasts it with the more common concepts of “aggregate” and “association” used by social theorists and philosophers. She argues that while an aggregate is a collection of individuals created by the sociologist/ethnographer/investigator based on a given attribute or set of attributes, the social group is not just a collection of individuals with particular attributes, because social groups
contribute to the creation of the identities of its members. Young explains: “though sometimes objective attributes are a necessary condition for classifying oneself or others as belonging to a certain social group, it is identification with a certain social status, the common history that social status produces, and self-identification that define the group as a group” (Young 1990, 44). She argues further that while an association is a collection of individuals with common aspirations, the social group is not constituted by the formal agreement of its members to come up with such a group based on some organizational constitution and bylaws that would make it no different to a “club, corporation, political party, church, college or union” (Young 1990, 44). Young points out that both the aggregate and the association models of collectivity are based on the assumption that there are individuals first and that they happen to become part of a collectivity. The social group model that she proffers is based on the assumptions that there are already social groups and that individuals may be thrown, in the sense of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), into such groups where their identities are shaped. Young believes that social groups emerge in three ways: first, through a collectivity’s self-differentiation in relation another collectivity; second, through some social processes that differentiates people based on economy, or culture, or gender, and other similar points of reference; and third, through one collectivity’s act of defining/identifying another collectivity (Cf. Young 1990, 43). The social group is the main analytic concept in Young’s theory of structural justice and collective responsibility because the social group is more often the recipient, or the victim, than the perpetrator of structural injustices.

If the social group is the main subject of Young’s structural analysis, this main subject is set on a context, or space, or field, that she calls the “social structure,” and sometimes the “social-structural processes” to emphasize the dynamism of such context/space/field. Instead of giving this concept a clear definition, she opted to just give four accounts in order to illustrate its general meaning: 1) as objective constraint, 2) as considering position, 3) as something produced in action, and 4) as unintended consequences. The first account, social structure/social-structural processes as objective constraint, is based on the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre’s (1905-1980) notion of the “practico-inert field” that is shaped by
past actions and affects the present by channeling some actions and blocking others. Young clarifies: “Many of the physical facts about most metropolitan regions of the United States today, for example, are structured products of a combination of social policies, investment decisions, cultural preferences, and racial hegemonies of the mid-twentieth century” (Young 2011, 54). The second account, social structure/social-structural processes as considering position, is based on the Austrian-American sociologist Peter Blau’s (1918-2002) idea of the social structure as “as a multi-dimensional space of different social positions,” as well as on the French sociologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930-2002) thought of the field as a context of different social positions (Quoted by Young 2011, 57; Cf. Young 2011, 57). In this account, social structure/social-structural processes refer to the initial standing of a given social group or individual in given context/space/field that would later on determine the range and possibilities of its action and interaction with the other social groups or individuals. This account is already alluded to in the first account in the sense a given context/space/field channels and constraints social groups and individuals differently, and these differences is based on the differences of their initial positions in such context/space/field.

The third account, social structure/social-structural processes as something produced in action, is based on the British sociologist Anthony Giddens’ (born: 1938) theory of structuration and Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus.” Young explains: “when individuals act, they are doing two things at once: (1) They are trying to bring about a state of affairs that they intend, and (2) they are reproducing the structural properties, the positional relations of rules and resources, on which they draw for these actions” (Young 2011, 60). The fourth account, social structure/social-structural processes as unintended consequences, is based on Sartre’s notion of “counter-finality,” the situation in which people are scampering to pursue their various ends that adds into a cumulative situation that works against their desired ends (Cf. Young 2011, 63). She clarifies: “Social structure... refers to the accumulated outcomes of the actions of the masses of individuals enacting their own projects, often uncoordinated with many others. The combination of actions affects the conditions of the actions of others, often producing outcomes not intended by any of the participating agents” (Young
At the bottom line, Young’s definitions of justice and injustice are founded on the presence or absence of domination and oppression in a social structure or social structural processes that may assist or hinder a given social group’s exercise of its capacities and attainment of its possibilities. But before examining more closely what she exactly means by this, it would be more beneficial to first take a look at her primary manifestations of structural injustice. In the essay “Five Faces of Oppression,” she mentions, as the title suggests, only five such manifestations; but in her essay “Insurgency and the Welfare Capitalist Society” she adds the over-administration of society as another manifestation of such injustice; furthermore, in many of her other essays, especially the ones in the book Inclusion and Democracy and Responsibility for Justice, she adds political exclusion as one more manifestation. First in her list of manifestations of structural injustice is exploitation, which in her post-Marxist framework is conceptualized as the systemic and un-symmetrical exchange of power/energy of the dominated/oppressed group with the wages from the privileged group (Cf. Young 1990, 49). The binary social groups involved here could be the workers and owners of capital, the women and men, the whites and the colored. Marginalization is Young’s second manifestation of structural injustice and it pertains to the systemic exclusion of some social groups from the pool of workers (Cf. Young 1990, 53). These marginalized people are often racially marked, such as the Blacks, Indians, Eastern Europeans, North Africans, Asians; but they could also be marked by some other circumstances, such as the aged, single mothers, and the physically and mentally disabled. Powerlessness is Young’s third manifestation of structural injustice and like exploitation and marginalization this is still conceptualized with reference to work. With her post-Marxist framework she makes a distinction between the social groups of the professionals and the non-professionals, with the latter being the specific victims of powerlessness. She defines the powerlessness of the non-professionals as the “lack the authority, status, and sense of self” (Young 1990, 57).

If exploitation, marginalization and powerlessness are conceptualized with reference to work, the four other manifestations of structural injustice according to Young are conceptualized in the
much wider contexts of culture, day to day existence and politics. Cultural imperialism as Young’s fourth manifestation of structural injustice is based on a term that was first used by the Argentine-American feminist philosopher Maria Lugones, and the American scholar on race and gender Elizabeth Spelman, particularly in their collaborative essay “Have We Got a Theory for You: Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for the Woman’s Voice.” Related to the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci’s (1891-1937) notion of “hegemony,” Young defines “cultural imperialism” as “the universalization of a dominant group’s experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm” (Young 1990, 59). The effects of cultural imperialism would range from the invisibility of the non-dominant social groups, to their construction as Others, to their stereotypical representations, or to their being marked as deviants. Violence is Young’s fifth manifestation of structural injustice and this refers to the physical and emotional harm inflicted on members of some social groups for the sheer reason that they are members of such groups. Young elaborates: “In American society women, Blacks, Asians, Arabs, gay men, and lesbians live under such threats of violence, and in at least some regions Jews, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and other Spanish-speaking Americans must fear such violence as well” (Young 1990, 61). As already mentioned, the essay “Insurgency and the Welfare Capitalist Society” presents the over-administration of society as Young’s sixth manifestation of structural injustice and it alludes to Habermas’ idea of the system’s colonization of the lifeworld that stifles the individuals’ spontaneity and freedom. She asserts: “increasingly the activities of everyday work and life come under rationalized bureaucratic control, subjecting people to the discipline of authorities and experts in many areas of life” (Young 1990, 76). Scattered through a number of essays is Young’s seventh manifestation of structural injustice, political exclusion, which is about some social groups’ lack of opportunity to participate in the creation of policies and laws that would affect their lives and communities. As such this manifestation of injustice is different from powerlessness which Young tied only to the context of work. Political exclusion for her is an injustice that occurs in the much wider social and political sphere.

After grasping Young’s notions of the social group, and of the social structure/social-structural processes, as well as her
enumerations of the main manifestations of structural injustices, we may now attempt to understand her theory of structural justice. This we may do by understanding what she means by structural injustice and by asking four crucial questions: 1) who is the victim of such structural injustice?; 2) what is the context where such structural injustice occurs?; 3) who is the perpetrator of such structural injustice?; and 4) how is structural injustice related to moral wrong and to specific injustice? The first question had already been answered: the social group stands as the victim of structural injustice. Although at the bottom line it is undeniably an individual who is victimized by structural injustices, he/she is victimized for the reason that he/she belongs to a particular group. Furthermore, because an individual belongs to a particular group in a special way, he/she will also be victimized in a special way. Young explains: “group differences cut across individual lives in a multiplicity of ways that can entail privilege and oppression for the same person in different respects” (Young 1990, 42).

The second question had also been settled already: the social structure/social-structural processes that serve as the context/space/field where structural injustice occurs. It was noticeable how Young made it a point that such social structure/social-structural processes are not something neutral or similar to an empty stage. In her first account, the social structure/social-structural processes are presented as something that facilitates some actions and constrains others; in her second account, they are portrayed as the totality of different and unequal initial positions; in the third account, they are pictured as something produced in action that sooner would determine other succeeding actions; and in the fourth account, they are described as negative cumulative effect of past actions that may be well intentioned in the first place. This non-neutrality of the social structure/social-structural processes is very significant as we address the third question, “who is the perpetrator of structural injustice,” for this will lead us to the dramatic twist in Young’s theory. The answer for the third question turns out to be the same answer for the second question: the social structure/social-structural processes in their collectivity is the perpetrator of structural injustice. She clarifies: “Oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the result of a few people’s choices or policies. Its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits,
and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules” (Young 1990, 41).

The fourth question can help us in further sharpening our understanding of Young’s structural injustice. Young writes: “the wrong is structural injustice, which is distinct from at least two other forms of harm or wrong, namely, that which comes about through individual interaction, and that which is attributable to the specific actions and policies of states or other powerful institutions” (Young 2011, 45). Structural injustice is different from an immoral action, because structural injustice could not pinpoint specific agent or agents perpetrating such action. Structural injustice is different from a wrong emanating from a specific action or policies of states or institutions, because structural injustice is an effect of a network of such actions or policies. Young, of course, does not close the possibility that structural injustice may occur simultaneously with an immoral action or with another wrong founded on a specific questionable action or policy. But because structural injustice is systemic, it will recur even if attendant individual immoral actions are punished or questionable specific actions or policies are rectified.

**Strategies in Addressing Structural Injustices**

Young’s philosophy reflects her life as a political activist. As soon as she proposes how to structurally analyze justice, or how to pinpoint particular structural situations of injustice, she just would not pause on her armchair and let the other political theorists and policy makers think of suitable solutions and remedies. On the contrary, it would appear that she is even more animated in looking for viable and doable ways and means on how to address the systemic wrongs that she had just exposed. Her main strategies in responding to structural injustices can be substantially found in the essays “Insurgency and the Welfare Capitalist Society,” “The Scaling of Bodies and the Politics of Identity,” “Social Movements and the Politics of Difference,” and “Affirmative Action and the Myth of Merit” from the book Justice and the Politics of Difference; and “Democracy and Justice,” and “Representation and Social Perspective” from the book Inclusion and Democracy. In these essays, her main strategies
are: 1) a psychological explanation of the root of discrimination, 2) a support for affirmative action, 3) an emphasis on the politics of difference, 4) a call to re-politicize the depoliticized aspects of policy making and to decolonize the colonized aspects of the lifeworld, and 5) faith for deliberative democracy. The first three strategies directly answer her five main manifestations of social injustice, namely: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. While the fourth and fifth strategies directly answer her sixth and seventh main manifestations of social injustice, namely and respectively: colonization of the lifeworld and political exclusion. These five strategies shall be discussed in more details in the following paragraphs.

Young's psychological explanation of the roots of discriminations against race, gender, sexual preference, age and abilities starts with the question why the phenomena persisted despite the modern laws that prohibit such phenomena. She thinks that these laws indeed had an impact on discrimination, but instead of eradicating discrimination these changed the modes of discrimination. In explaining this insight she makes use of Giddens three-levelled theory of subjectivity that the latter utilized in grappling with social relations and social structures. Giddens thought that action and interaction may occur at the level of discursive consciousness, where they are and can be verbalized; or at the level of practical consciousness, where they, as habitual and routine activities, are at the fringes of consciousness but nevertheless reflexively monitored by the subject; or at the level of the basic security system, where the ontological integrity of the subject is situated (Cf. Young 1990, 131). Young's point is that the laws against discrimination might have effectively checked discrimination at the level of the discursive consciousness, but not necessarily at the levels of the practical consciousness and basic security system. To explain further the persistence of discrimination at the deepest level of subjectivity, the level of the basic security system, she borrows the notion of abject from Kristeva (Cf. Young 1990, 142-145). In Young’s appropriation, the man of color, the woman, the homosexual, the aged, and the disabled are abjects that are capable of disrupting dominant subject’s project of self-construction as something pure, strong, heterosexual, youthful/alive and able bodied. The dominant subject fears and despises
the abject, but at the same time fascinated by it. His/her fear and disdain come from the threat that the abject would become part of him/her; and his/her fascination comes from the reality that he/she needs the abject in affirming his/her superiority. It is in this sense that the man of color, the woman, the homosexual, the aged, and the disabled are threats to the subject’s level of basic security system as they can potentially unravel his/her ontological integrity. Young’s psychological explanation of the roots of discrimination comes with two calls: 1) for philosophy and political theory to include in their investigations on justice not only actions that flow from the level of discursive consciousness but also those that flow from the levels of practical consciousness and basic security system; and 2) for a cultural revolution consisting of the identity self affirmation of the man of color, the woman, the homosexual, the aged, and the disabled, of consciousness raising among themselves, and of consciousness raising among the dominant social groups (Cf. Young 1990, 150-154).

Young’s support for affirmative action is presented as a response to the theorists and policy makers who are against such practice. Their critique of affirmative action is hinged on the thought that such practice as embodied in policies that prioritize and give advantage to the underprivileged and underrepresented social groups in the spheres of employment, education and business, is contrary to the basic principles of non-discrimination (Cf. Young 1990, 192). This critique simply points out that affirmative action's intention of counter-acting the discrimination suffered by some social groups resulted to new forms of discrimination against other social groups. Young counter-critiques this reasoning by unpacking three problematic assumptions of the current practice and debates surrounding affirmative action. First, she points out that currently affirmative action is largely conceptualized as a system of redress to some past injustices suffered by some social groups (Cf. Young 1990, 194). This creates a big question because the beneficiaries of affirmative action are no longer the same individuals who supposedly suffered injustices in the past. Second, she indicates that the objections against affirmative action were framed under the paradigm of social justice as distributive justice. Under such paradigm, the state, the local governments, and private institutions are indeed pressured to equally distribute opportunities and jobs
to individuals based on merit and not on any other considerations, such as their being part of particular social groups (Cf. Young 1990, 192-193). Third, and related to the second, she invites our attention to the assumption that merit, as the sole criteria of the distribution of opportunities and jobs, is something that can have a clear and unbiased measure that could guarantee fairness. Young deconstructs the hitherto innocuous criteria of merit as something that would eventually favour the white, heterosexual, young, able-bodied, able-minded male (Cf. Young 1990, 193). She therefore proposes to shift the debate under the paradigm of social justice as structural justice as this would construe affirmative action as a mechanism that would enable the underprivileged and underrepresented social groups to counteract the structural injustices, and in the process attain a playing field that would be more or less comparable to those of the dominant social groups.

As already mentioned, Young’s psychological explanation of the roots of discrimination against race, gender, sexual preference, age and abilities comes with a call for cultural revolution that involves self affirmation for these dominated and oppressed social groups. Her emphasis on the politics of difference is a politicization and radicalization of this advocacy for self affirmation, and starts with a critique of the idea of assimilation, the policy that aims to eradicate differences and to achieve a homogenous society. She argues that assimilation, no matter how egalitarian its goals are, would in practice put the subordinate social groups in an unfavourable condition as the dominant social groups would be the ones to define the directions, values, norms of a given society, even the conceptualization of the common good. She clarifies: “the real differences between oppressed groups and the dominant norm, however, tend to put them at a disadvantage in measuring up to these standards, and for that reason assimilationist policies perpetuate their disadvantage” (Young 1990, 164). Young recalls how during the second half of the 20th century a number of social movements had affirmed their Otherness and made it the foundation of their coming together and eventual mobilization towards demanding for specific rights and the creation or abolition of certain policies. Examples of these social movements are the Black Power of the Afro-Americans, the Red Power of the Native Americans, the feminist movements, and the more current gay and lesbian
movements (Cf. Young 1990, 1959). Young’s politics of difference is about subordinate social groups’ political empowerment so that they will have their say in defining the directions, values, norms of a given society, and in contesting the myth of the common good that the dominant social groups had imposed on them in the past. She makes it clear, however, that politics of difference should not be taken as an essentialist discourse, as this would imply that the disadvantage of a given social group is due to the weaker nature and constitution of its members. Instead, politics of difference should be framed on a relational discourse, implying that the disadvantage of a given group is only due to some unfavourable social structures and cultural practices (Cf. Young 1990, 157).

Young’s call to re-politicize the depoliticized aspects of policy making and to decolonize the colonized aspects of the lifeworld is her response to the mode of oppression brought about by the welfare state’s tendency to make more and more areas of private life subject to bureaucratic planning and administration. What makes this manifestation of structural injustice more sinister is that its policies were depoliticized, meaning taken away from the public sphere and given to the charge of experts who in turn claim legitimacy for their plans and actions based on the grounds of science and rationality. Young states: “most active policies enacted by government in the welfare capitalist society are not laws, however, but regulations established by agency department heads, often without any public discussion” (Young 1990, 74). Furthermore, this manifestation of structural injustice victimizes not only the members of the subordinate social groups, but practically everyone in the society, although in varying degrees and circumstances. Young recalled again how the social movements during the second half of the 20th century had reacted against the depoliticized colonization of the lifeworld by questioning specific policies and pushing back the welfare state’s rational encroachment. She writes: “they seek to loosen social life from the colonizing influence of welfare state and corporate bureaucracy, to create alternative institutional forms and independent discussion” (Young 1990, 82). To be more specific, vigilance against seemingly innocuous policies, cultivating existing public spheres, creating other public spheres, and bringing questionable policies to these public spheres are what Young meant by re-politicizing the depoliticized aspects of policy making and
decolonizing the colonized aspects of the lifeworld.

Young’s faith for deliberative democracy is already implied in her emphasis on the politics of difference as well as in her call to re-politicize the depoliticized aspects of policy making and to decolonize the colonized aspects of the lifeworld. But these two previously mentioned strategies in addressing structural injustice can only find their fullest effectiveness in the context of a functioning deliberative democracy. In laying down her idea of what deliberative democracy is, she first contrasts it with its competing model, aggregative democracy. Aggregative democracy is all about the decision making process that is founded on “the most widely and strongly held preferences” of the members of a given society (Young 2000, 19). It is an efficient model because it will just feel the pulse of the people through elections, referendums, polls and votes. But it leaves very little room for exchanges of thoughts between opposing views, and it would tend to drown the preferences of the smaller social groups. These are the reasons why Young prefers the more laborious and tedious process of deliberative democracy. The decision making of deliberative democracy is not based on the raw preferences of the members of a given society, instead it is based on the consensus of these members on which is the most rational alternative after all alternatives have been discussed, critiqued and debated upon. Young says: “participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees are supported by the best reasons” (Young 2000, 23). After showing the superiority of the deliberative model over the aggregative model of democracy, she proceeds to critique the deliberative model as currently practiced in some contemporary societies. She claims that this model tends to: 1) assume that political deliberation is always a face to face deliberation; 2) take the argument as the primary form of political communication; 3) be captivated by the myth of the common good; and 4) follow the norms of orderliness (Cf. Young 2000, 18). Following these critiques, she proposes first that deliberative democracy should realize that modern democracies could no longer return to the Greek template of direct democracy, but should be contented with representative democracy which nevertheless can still be inclusive, once it is decentered from the legislative halls and get connected to other public spheres, such as
“the streets, squares, church basements, and theatres of civil society” (Young 2000, 168). Secondly, aside from the formal argument and counter-argument, political communication should also recognize other forms of expression such as speeches, graffiti, placards, protest arts and the like. Thirdly, Young had already expressed her objections against the myth of the common good and her invitation to all social groups to present to the public sphere their group-specific goods. Fourthly, as political communication transcends the arguments and counter-arguments, the other modes of political communication should be expected to deviate from the orderly norm of restrained and controlled debates of the powerful and the educated members of the society.

THEORY OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

So far, Young’s five strategies in addressing structural injustice are largely dependent on the subordinate groups’ capacity to organize and mobilize themselves and be able to assert their group specific political goals. But their subordinate status would severely limit their capacity to do so. Young realizes that there is a need for the other more privileged social groups and all other social groups to help them in the various aspects and stages of their political struggle. Her theory of collective responsibility is her way of enjoining all social groups in concerted efforts of working for justice. The bulk of Young’s theory of collective responsibility is found in the book Responsibility for Justice, particularly in the essays “A Social Connection Model,” and “Avoiding Responsibility.” Her theory stands on the crucial distinction between two senses of the word “responsibility”: responsibility as something originating from guilt or fault, and responsibility as something originating from the individuals’ social roles and positions (Cf. Young 2011, 104). The first sense of responsibility serves as the foundation of what she calls the “liability model of responsibility;” while the second one serves as the foundation of what she calls the “social connection model of responsibility.”

The liability model of responsibility aims to mobilize an individual or group to do something compensatory or reparatory because they have been found to be guilty or liable for a certain fault or harm. Courts function this way and Young does not intend
to belittle this model of responsibility. But she certainly finds this model inadequate in the context of structural injustice. The first shortcoming of this model would be its inability to deal with a situation in which the guilty or the liable agent cannot be satisfactorily pinpointed for the reason that in many cases of structural injustice it is the social structures that are at fault and sanctioning specific agents who appear to be the most guilty and the most liable would not guarantee that such structural injustices would no longer recur. Young argues: “the primary reason that the liability model does not apply to issues of structural injustice is that structures are produced and reproduced by large numbers of people acting according to normally accepted rules and practices, and it is in the nature of such structural processes that their potentially harmful effects cannot be traced directly to any particular contributors to the process” (Young 2011, 100). The second shortcoming of this model is its tendency to trigger the process of blame game, which at the bottom line may just paralyze the society and prevent it from working for justice. The ones who are accused of being guilty and liable would become defensive, while the ones who were supposed to be the victims could be consumed with spiritually destructive resentment. The third shortcoming of this model is its predisposition to exculpate the seemingly less guilty and less liable individuals and group, thereby exempting them from having the responsibility to work for justice. The fourth shortcoming of this model is its being reactionary and backward looking that hints its lack of dynamism.

Young’s theory of collective responsibility is constituted by her proposal to use the social connection model of responsibility in matters concerning structural injustice. She writes: “the social connection model of responsibility says that individuals bear responsibility for structural injustice because they contribute by their actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes” (Young 2011, 105). Hence, this model does not bother about pinpointing who are the guilty and liable, or who are the most guilty and liable agents, because it is more interested at looking at the defects in the social structures. This model would not trigger the unnecessary blame game because it is not interested in blaming anyone. Thus, dominant groups would a assume a defensive posture, while subordinate groups would not be preoccupied with the thoughts of their being victims. Freed from a possible animosity, the social
groups can more easily cooperate in working to rectify problematic social structures. Instead of conceptualizing responsibility as an individualistic and sectoral duty, the social connection model casts responsibility as a collective duty by virtue of each individuals' being part of a society with defective social structures. Young explains: “where there are structural injustices, finding that some people are guilty of perpetrating specific wrongful actions does not absolve others whose actions contribute to the outcomes from bearing responsibility in a different way” (Young 2011, 106). Responsibility under the social connection model is proactive and forward looking because it aims to stop the recurrence of a given structural injustice, and it is dynamic because it enjoins all the members of a given society to work hand in hand in rectifying the problematic aspects of their social structures. Hence, Young was able to establish that the task of addressing structural injustice does not belong to the subordinate social groups alone, but to all social groups, specially to the dominant social groups in any given society.

Young notes four common reasons used by individuals and social groups to turn away from their collective responsibility. The first of these is reification or the reasoning that society works that way and that there is nothing we can do about it except just deal with it (Cf. Young 2011, 154). The second of these is to deny the reality of interconnectedness and accept responsibility only for those faults and harms that can be directly traced to us (Cf. Young 2011, 158). The third of these is to accept interconnectedness but to rationalize that we cannot address structural injustice because our time and attention are consumed by the more immediate demands of relationships and everyday lives (Cf. Young 2011, 161). The fourth of these is to accept that something must be done about the structure but assert that changing the structure is not our task (Cf. Young 2011, 166).

CALL FOR A GLOBAL DISCOURSE ON JUSTICE

Young’s discourse on global justice is an implication of her insistence on the structural way of looking at justice as well as on the social connection model of responsibility. The practice of international relations, whether in the area of economics, politics or culture, would create structures that are subject to the structural analysis of
whether they are just or unjust, or in the language of Young, whether they result in the oppression and domination of peoples from other countries or not. Furthermore, social connections obviously do not end at political borders; hence the call for responsibility certainly should also not end at such borders. The concerns for global justice are more pressing in the context of structural model of justice than they are in the distributive model of justice. In the latter model, everyone can easily say let the peoples beyond our borders take care of their own fair distributions of goods and opportunities. The bulk of Young’s call for a global discourse on justice is found in the book Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and Responsibility for Justice, but its component essays are actually elaborations and applications of a the thoughts that she already fully developed in the essay “Self-Determination and Global Democracy” in the book Inclusion and Democracy. As the necessity for a discourse on global justice is already very compelling under Young’s structural theory of justice, her call for such discourse consists of her reconstruction of the meaning of self-determination of states to give more conceptual room for structural interconnectedness, which is followed by her more practical proposals on the need for a global governing body and on how the United Nations Organization can tweak its own structures to become a more effective and suitable organization to mediate the various states’ claim to justice.

A global discourse on justice would immediately appear to be contradictory to the more entrenched idea of self-determination of states which is founded on the concept of non-interference. Young elaborates: “just as it denies rights of interference by outsiders in a jurisdiction, this concept entails that each self-determining entity has no inherent obligations with respect to outsiders” (Young 2000, 257). She, therefore, has to deconstruct this idea of self-determination as non-interference in order to make her call for a global discourse on justice operationally feasible. Non-interference is not actually a realistic concept in the sense that in practice states are politically, economically and culturally interconnected. Without a global discourse on justice, these existing interconnections might already have supported injustices. Thus, instead of insisting on non-interference as the key concept for self-determination, Young proposes to replace this with non-domination. She explains: “in so
far as outsiders are affected by the activities of self-determining people, those others have a legitimate claim to have their interests and needs taken into account even though they are outside the government jurisdiction. Conversely, outsiders should recognize that when they themselves affect a people, the latter can legitimately claim that they should have their interests taken into account in so far as they may be adversely affected" (Young 2000, 259). The switch from non-interference to non-domination opened self-determination to the possibility of discursively addressing whatever injustices that might have emerged from some given states’ practices on international relations.

Young’s faith on deliberative democracy to address questions and claims to justice necessitates the existence of global public spheres where such questions and claims may be settled. She proposes that there be at least seven such public spheres, which she calls “regulatory regimes” to take care of the following areas: “(1) peace and security, (2) environment, (3) trade and finance, (4) direct investment and capital utilization, (5) communications and transportation, (6) human rights, including labour standards and welfare rights, (7) citizenship and migration” (Young 2000, 267). Young thinks that presently the United Nations Organization, although it is the most promising international body in terms of its comprehensive membership, is not yet prepared for the task of providing global public spheres. One of the most glaring problems of the United Nations Organization is its vulnerability to the wishes of the more powerful member states. In terms of infrastructure, this organization is severely hindered by its lack of reliable and neutral military force, as well as its lack of substantial and independent funding. Nonetheless, the United Nations Organization can serve as the momentary global public sphere until the world realizes the urgency for the need set up more effective and efficient regulatory regimes.

APPLICABILITY OF YOUNG’S THEORIES TO THE ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Whereas Young is convinced that the broad points of her structural theory of justice and collective responsibility can be used as a framework in putting up a deliberative system of global
justice, she is not certain about the appropriateness of imposing her theories on other individual countries. In the “Epilogue” of the book Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young expresses her warning that her theories were developed in the specific context of the welfare society of the United States of America and should not just be unreflectively be borrowed as analytic framework in studying injustices in “the Southern or Eastern Hemispheres” (Cf. Young 1990, 257). She expects that her theories will undergo modifications and changes as they are brought to the other parts of the globe where conditions are different from those of her homeland.

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